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MEMORANDUM

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Noted by HAK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

SECRET/SENSITIVE   December 14, 1972

MORI/CDF C05082419

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT: [   ] Appraisal of   25X1
                           the Post-Ceasefire Period

[   ] an appraisal of Hanoi's   25X1
intentions for a post-ceasefire period (Tab A) which foresees a "no
peace, no war" covert struggle in which the GVN seems likely to
prevail. He notes that this confronts Hanoi with a choice between a
long-term covert effort against heavy odds and a resumption of military
hostilities. While Hanoi seems to be preparing for the latter contingency,
one cannot, he adds, estimate whether the North Vietnamese will have
the will or the means to start up the war again.

[   ] reports of possible North Vietnamese   25X1
troop withdrawals, but predicts that such withdrawals, if any, would
be only of token significance. He believes that the Communists will
be cautious, covert and selective in carrying out acts of terrorism
and violence until U.S. troops are withdrawn in order not to jeopardize
the withdrawal. He further believes that enemy documents and briefings
calling for an eventual resumption of the war may be hortative and that
the Communists are likely to spend some time on the political struggle
before clearly sabotaging the ceasefire.

Comment: If, [   ] the GVN prevails in the   25X1
political struggle, Hanoi is most likely to resume the war when it
believes this can be done without risking renewed U.S. intervention.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY

WARNING NOTICE —   25X1
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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